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Abstract
In this paper, we model the impact of networks on knowledge growth in an in-
novating industry. Speciﬁcally, we compare two mediums of knowledge exchange;
random interaction, and the case in which interaction occurs on a ﬁxed architec-
ture. In a simulation study, we investigate how the medium of knowledge exchange
contributes to knowledge growth under diﬀerent scenarios related to the industry’s
innovative potential. We measure innovative potential by considering the extent to
which knowledge can be codiﬁed, and the available technological opportunities. Our
results tend to support the conjecture that spatial clustering generates higher long
run knowledge growth rates in industries characterized by highly tacit knowledge,
while the opposite is true when the degree of codiﬁcation is important.
Key Words: Network, Network Industry, Clustering, Innovation, Knowledge.
1 Introduction
In recent years, work on technical change has emphasized the importance of information
ﬂows and transfers. At the same time, research on the economics of knowledge has changed
our view from that of the early 1960s. We no longer think of knowledge as a public good,
easily reproduced and diﬀused; knowledge is now considered at best a quasi-public good,
and reproduction and diﬀusion are non-trivial activities. Thus there has been concern with
mechanisms and structures that impinge on knowledge transmission. These concerns have
prompted two important ideas about how to promote knowledge production and circulation,
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1namely clustering or agglomeration of inventive activities; and the localization of technical
change. In a sense both of these approaches are driven by the same concerns regarding
critical masses of researchers, epistemic communities who can share knowledge easily, and
t h ei m p o r t a n c eo fa b s o r p t i v ec a p a c i t yf o rk n o w l e d g ea c q u i s i t i o n .
Knowledge spillovers, the existence of local factor endowments, specialized ﬁnancial
and legal facilities all favour the localization of knowledge diﬀusion. Numerous studies
on clustering ﬁnd that geographical proximity tends to facilitate innovation, and one of
the most important factors is knowledge spillovers [1]. Jaﬀe et al. [2], Baptista [3] and
Baptista and Swann [4] all show empirically that diﬀusion of knowledge is faster within
geographical clusters.1 But the value of clustering is also a function of the characteristics
of the knowledge base. The propensity to cluster tends to be higher in industries where
knowledge is more tacit, since in these situations the transmission of knowledge requires
repeated, face-to-face contacts [6]. This observation is connected with industry life cycles,
since it is generally accepted that in the early phases of the industry life cycle, knowledge
is less codiﬁed, so face-to-face interaction tends to facilitate its transmission [7]. Empirical
research also suggests that the propensity to cluster in the early stages of the life cycle can
be higher [8]. The key in both ideas has to do with the ability of an agent to learn and
integrate knowledge that is available. This “absorptive capacity” depends on factors like
the level of prior knowledge, the degree of codiﬁcation, and the extent to which the sender
and receiver share tacit knowledge. (On these issues see for example Refs [9-11]).
The value of absorbing knowledge is two-fold. It increases an agent’s knowledge stock
directly, and it provides the agent with new knowledge that can be combined with his/her
existing knowledge.2 This ﬁts with recent descriptions of the innovative process as recombi-
nation of a ﬁrm’s existing knowledge.3 But if recombination of a ﬁrm’s existing knowledge
can spur innovation, so much the more can the combination of new knowledge with existing
knowledge (on this, see Antonelli [18]). If innovation is driven by recombination, spurred
1For a survey on these issues, see Feldman [5].
2See Kogut and Zander [12] on what they refer to as “combinative capability”.
3A concrete manifestation of this process is the architectural innovation as deﬁned by Henderson and
Clark [13]. As we use it here, however, the innovation process is more general in the sense that it en-
compasses generation of new knowledge, products or processes whereas architectural innovation is deﬁned
by “reconﬁguration of an established system to link together existing components in a new way”.(See for
example, Refs [13-17])
2by the diﬀusion of knowledge, it is clear why concern about improving knowledge ﬂows
among innovating agents has increased in recent years, and has prompted interest in both
clustering and networking.
Positive externalities from agglomeration provide incentives for clustering, but negative
externalities, such as increased congestion, can also exist [19]. In addition, the rapid de-
velopments in information and communication technologies are clearly carrying knowledge
diﬀusion to a more global scale. The more codiﬁed is the knowledge base of the industry,
the weaker is the need for geographical proximity to ensure eﬃcient diﬀusion of knowl-
edge and thus the eﬃcient recombination in innovation. Thus localization of innovative
activity may not, in all cases, be the most eﬀective way to guarantee eﬃcient knowledge
transmission and in turn the innovative potential of agents.
Regardless of the scope of the diﬀusion, whether local or global, knowledge networks are
the main means through which diﬀusion is realised. Diﬀusion occurs through interaction,
and thus the structure of the network over which agents interact obviously inﬂuences the
extent of diﬀusion, and thus the innovative potential of the economy. If the system is
characterized as a network or a graph, communication structures that exhibit cliques of
agents can be interpreted to represent high clustering, whereas geographically random
networks connote diﬀusion on a more global scale. Empirical studies have found that
networks of innovators exist and have successfully characterized the structures of these
networks (Refs [20-22]). Further, simulation studies have shown that network structures can
have a signiﬁcant impact on how rapidly knowledge grows in an economy [23]. Obviously
these features of networks interact with industry-speciﬁc factors, which should be taken
into account for developing regional policies.
In this paper we try to address all these aspects of the innovation process. We model
agents as located on a network and any agent receives knowledge from other agents with
whom he/she has direct links (that is, agents in his/her neighbourhood). Firstly, the
extent to which the receiver can increase his/her knowledge is a function of the relative
knowledge levels between him/her and the sender. We assume that the recipient of a
knowledge broadcast uses the new knowledge to increase his/her own knowledge stock.
However, if the recipient is too weak vis-á-vis the sender he/she has diﬃculties absorbing
that knowledge. By contrast, if his/her knowledge level is close to that of the sender,
3absorption is not an issue, but he/she receives little new which he/she can combine with
his/her existing knowledge. The functional form that we employ controls this concave,
non-monotone relationship between knowledge acquisition and relative knowledge levels
between the sender and the receiver. Secondly, how eﬀective agents are in knowledge
acquisition is also a function of the features of the industry. In an industry, knowledge can
be weakly or strongly codiﬁed, which will aﬀect average abilities to innovate. Similarly,
industries can be diﬀerentiated by their general level of technological opportunities, which
also aﬀects average abilities to innovate. One parameter controls the extent of absorption
as a function of these industry features.
We look at the mean knowledge growth under diﬀerent network architectures on which
agents transmit knowledge. At one extreme of the family of architectures that we consider
we have an entirely local network with high cliquishness (and thus clustering). At the other
we consider a network with no spatial structure, in which diﬀusion is global. We analyse
knowledge growth in the family of networks that lie between these two extremes. In this
framework we observe that the network architecture that performs best depends on the
properties of the knowledge base and the innovation process. The simulation results indicate
that clustering is only eﬃcient when knowledge is diﬃcult to absorb and technological
opportunities are higher, which we suggest is typical of industries in the early stages of
their life cycle.
2T h e M o d e l
We begin with a schematic description of the model, before giving the technical details of
the parameterization of the network architecture and the dynamics of knowledge creation,
distribution and acquisition. The issue of the agent rationality of broadcasting knowledge
is left aside: rather, observing that it exists, we are interested in the eﬀects of the structures
over which it takes place (see [24] for a model in which knowledge sharing is an equilibrium
behaviour).
42.1 A schematic description of the model
A large population of individuals is located on a graph, each agent having direct connections
with a small number of other agents. Each agent has a scalar knowledge endowment. At
random times, an agent is selected; he/she innovates, after which he/she broadcasts his/her
updated knowledge to his/her direct neighbours. Knowledge is received and (partially)
assimilated by agents in the broadcaster’s neighbourhood. Below we explain the two aspects
of the model; knowledge interaction and network structure.
2.1.1 Knowledge interaction
Consider n agents existing on an undirected, connected graph G(S,Γ),w h e r eS = {1,...,n}
is the set of agents (vertices) and Γ = {Γi,∀i ∈ S} the list of connections (the vertices to
which each vertex is connected). Speciﬁcally, Γi = {j ∈ S−{i}|d(i,j)=1 }, where d(i,j)
is the length of the shortest path (geodesic) from vertex i to vertex j on the graph. Only
agents separated by one edge can interact: when i broadcasts only those agents in Γi are
potential recipients. In expected value the network is of uniform degree: E[#Γi]=s. The
algorithm for constructing it is given in Section 2.1.3.
Each individual i ∈ S is characterized by a knowledge endowment which evolves over
time as the agent innovates and receives information broadcast by other agents. For-
mally, let vi,t denote agent i’s time t knowledge endowment. Though we employ the word
knowledge, vi,t should rather be seen as a form of human capital or competence, whose
accumulation results from individuals performing learning and innovative activities. To
clarify matters, the interpretation of having, for two agents i and j, the inequality vi,t >v j,t
is that i knows everything that j knows, and has some knowledge in addition.
We now consider four “axiomatic” assumptions that distinguish knowledge from other
sorts of human capital. In modelling increases in an agent’s knowledge as a result of receipt
of new information:
(A1) the resultant knowledge level is continuous in the initial level of the recipient;
(A2) if the recipient knows more than the broadcaster the knowledge level of the recipient
does not change (which also justiﬁes the assumption regarding the knowledge overlap
above);
5(A3) when the recipient’s knowledge level is small relative to that of the broadcaster, the
increment to his/her knowledge decreases as he/she falls further behind;
(A4) it is in general possible for a recipient to leapfrog the broadcaster, achieving a higher
knowledge level than the broadcaster after the episode.
The ﬁrst assumption needs little explanation. The second one seems reasonable in
that if what I tell you is already completely familiar to you, it is unlikely to provoke any
innovative activity on your part. The third assumption arises from the following idea. As
your knowledge outstrips mine more and more, it becomes increasingly diﬃcult for me to
understand what you are telling me. Thus as the recipient’s knowledge level decreases
(relative to that of the broadcaster) his/her absorptive capacity, and thus his/her ability to
use what he/she hears eﬀectively in innovation falls. The fourth hypothesis seems intuitively
obvious – a great part of the motivation for ﬁrms to innovate is to become the industry
leader, and this must be possible in a model of innovation.
These axioms are formalized in the following way. If agent i makes an exogenous
innovation in period t, his/her knowledge increases according to
vi,t+1 = vi,t (1 + βi), (1)
where the βis are i.i.d. over some small interval (0,β].4 Diﬀerences in individual innovative
abilities capture inter ﬁrm heterogeneity. Having innovated (increasing his/her knowledge
level from vi(t) to vi(t+1)), agent i then broadcasts to any agent j ∈ Γi. When i broadcasts,
the knowledge endowment of j increases as
vj,t+1 = vj,t [1 + g(vj,t,v i,t+1)], (2)
where g(·,·) satisﬁes the 4 axioms of absorption and innovation. In the numerical analysis
below, we deﬁne g(·,·) as















4In the simulations, increasing β did not inﬂuence the results, thus it is set equal to 0.0005.
6the ratio of the recipient’s to broadcaster’s knowledge level. Given the knowledge level of
the broadcaster, g(·,·) is continuous in the level of the recipient (A1).T h emax operator
ensures that if the recipient already knows what is being broadcast, there is no beneﬁtf r o m
receiving it (A2).G i v e n vi,t+1, g(·,v i,t+1) is decreasing in its ﬁrst argument vj,t for small
vj,t (A3) and approaches zero as vj,t → 0. Finally for γ > 1,v j,t+1 >v i,t+1 for some values
of vj,t (A4).
2.1.2 Innovative potential and knowledge ﬂows
Figure 1 represents the ratio of the recipient’s new – in the sense of posterior to the
broadcast – knowledge level relative to that of the broadcaster, as a function of this ratio
before the transmission.













































Figure 1: Absorption and innovation as functions of ri,j, the ratio of the recipient to the
broadcaster’s knowledge endowment; two polar cases are presented: on panel (a),γ =1
corresponds to pure absorption, whereas on panel (b),γ =4displays both absorption
(vertical lines) and innovation (horizontal lines).
The 45◦ line on the right side of ri,j =1indicates that it is only possible to learn from
more advanced people; if the recipient has more knowledge than the sender, ri,j > 1 and
the knowledge of the receiver does not change. For ri,j ≤ rc, there is only imitation: the
recipient does not leapfrog the broadcaster. In this region, “total” knowledge creation can
be seen as the vertically shaded area on the left of rc. By contrast, for 1 >r i,j ≥ rc there is
7explicitly innovation and leapfrogging of the sender by the receiver. In this region, “total”
knowledge creation is the horizontally shaded area plus the vertically shaded area to the
right of rc. How these areas respond to changes in γ is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The various contributions to knowledge creation as functions of γ.
In Figure 2, consider ﬁrst the behaviour of rc, the implicit solution to
rc [1 + r
γ
c (1 − r
γ
c)] = 1
which is in the interval [0,1]. The critical rc (curve 1) ﬁrst falls with γ, before slowly rising
again. As a consequence the total amount of knowledge creation from imitation (curve 3)
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a n di sd e p i c t e da sc u r v e2i nF i g u r e2 .A sc a nb es e e n ,i tp e a k sa tγ =
√
2. Finally, Curve
84 shows the contribution of innovation. It is an increasing function of γ.5
Thus, γ captures two eﬀects that work in opposite directions.
First, the amount of knowledge accumulation attributable to imitation (curve 3 in ﬁgure
2) falls as γ increases. The second eﬀect is that the amount of knowledge accumulation
due to imitation (in which the receiver leapfrogs the sender) increases with γ (curve 4). As
γ increases knowledge growth becomes concentrated on those agents with high ri,j values.
In a certain sense this creates selectivity in knowledge accumulation.
The precision in the argument above is based on an implicit assumption on the distri-
bution of knowledge among agents: for any broadcast, the ri,j values of the recipients are
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. While in practice this will almost never be the
case, the two eﬀects we discussed are real, and we expect the behaviour of the system to
be driven by their interplay.
One way of thinking about γ is that it captures the innovative potential of industries,
the extent of knowledge tacitness, technological opportunities, and relatedly the phase of
the industry life cycle. It is generally accepted that in the earliest phases of the industry
life cycles, technological opportunitie sa r eh i g h e rb u tk n o w l e d g ei sl e s sc o d i ﬁed (which
decreases the extent of absorption). The functional form that we employ in knowledge
creation permits us to model this aspect. We assume that highly tacit knowledge renders
the prior knowledge level of the recipient important, i.e. who gets the knowledge matters
more for innovation. This is why higher γ implies that knowledge ﬂows are more selective,
in the sense that the agents in the high end of the knowledge spectrum beneﬁtm o r ef r o m
the technological opportunities. Low levels of γ has the opposite eﬀect. This could be
interpreted to mean that knowledge is more codiﬁed, yet technological opportunities are
lower. Thus, a wider range of agents can beneﬁt from a broadcast (knowledge ﬂow is less
selective), but the extent to which they can leapfrog the sender is limited.
Having speciﬁed a schematic description of knowledge interaction, the following section
analyses the network dynamics.
5To link Figures 1 and 2: for γ =4for example, the value of the imitation is equal to the vertically
shaded area in ﬁgure 1 panel (b); the value of innovation in Figure 2 is equal to the vertically shaded area
in Figure 1 panel (b). Consequently the value of total knowledge created is the total shaded area, which is
curve 2 in Figure 2, and which is the sum of curves 3 and 4.
92.1.3 Interaction patterns
We aim to compare, in terms of aggregate knowledge levels, two diﬀerent cases. In the ﬁrst
case, holding the architecture of the network ﬁxed throughout a single simulation, we run
simulations for diﬀerent architectures, and investigate whether the network architecture
matters. In the second case, each time the randomly selected agent broadcasts, he/she
does so to a diﬀerent set of agents (we call this case homogeneous mixing), so that there
is no network within a single simulation. We investigate how diﬀusion over a network
compares to the homogeneous mixing case. Below each of the two cases is explained in
detail.
Network In the case of ﬁxed networks, the network structure on which agents interact
is held ﬁxed in a single simulation, i.e. every time a particular agent broadcasts, the
same set of agents – his/her neighbours – receive information. In diﬀerent simulations,
however, we vary the structure of this network by the following re-wiring procedure. The
agents are located at ﬁxed, regular, intervals around a circle. At one extreme of the space
of network structures, we have a regular structure: each agent is connected to his/her s
nearest neighbours, s/2 on each side. 6At the other extreme each agent is connected to,
on average, s agents located at random on the circle. To interpolate, we use the following
algorithm. Create the regular structure. With probability p rewire each edge of the graph.
That is, sequentially examine each edge of the graph; with probability p disconnect one of
its vertices, and connect it to a vertex chosen uniformly at random. By this algorithm, we
tune the degree of randomness in the graph with parameter p ∈ [0,1].7
The structural properties of these graphs can be captured by the concepts of average
path length and average cliquishness. To illustrate, in friendship networks, the path length
is the number of friendships in the shortest chain connecting two agents, whereas cliquish-
ness reﬂects the extent to which friends of one agent are also friends of each other. Formally,
deﬁning d(i,j) as the length of the shortest path between i and j, the average path length
6While this algorithm does not produce a scale-free network [25] it is a standard way to explore this
family of networks.























where X(j,l)=1if j ∈ Γl and X(j,l)=0otherwise.
Homogeneous mixing In the homogeneous mixing case, there is no network on which
interaction is mediated. Agents interact in a totally random manner, and broadcast each
time to diﬀerent set of s agents. For all i ∈ S w h oi sc a l l e dt ob r o a d c a s t ,Γi is randomly
constructed each period by drawing s vertices in the population S without replacement.
3R e s u l t s
We consider an economy with n =5 0 0agents, each agent being connected to, on average,
s =1 0other agents. Each agent is endowed with a knowledge scalar, initialized randomly
at the outset from a uniform distribution U[0,1]. Two separate families of histories are
run.
First, network structure is ﬁxed. In this case, within a single simulation run, composed
of τ =3 0 ,000 periods, we hold the value of p ﬁxed, and compute the resulting knowledge
levels. In each period, one randomly selected agent innovating according to (1) and then
broadcasting his/her knowledge. The receivers are those who are directly connected to
him/her, speciﬁed at the beginning of the run, and their knowledge levels are updated
according to (2). Each agent is therefore selected 60 times on average to broadcast his/her
knowledge. A simulation run consists in setting a p value, creating the network, setting
the value of γ and so creating the innovation function, and then iterating the process for τ
periods. For each p,γ pair we preform 100 repilications. We vary p from p =0(a perfectly
regular structure) to p =1(a purely random graph), and use 15 values of γ ranging from
1t o5 .
Second we perform simulations under homogeneous mixing. As in the previous case, 100
replications are recorded. Every period an agent is selected randomly to broadcast, he/she
11innovates according to (1), and broadcasts his/her knowledge to a randomly selected set of
agents. The receivers’ knowledge levels are updated according to (2).
We measure the aggregate performance of the system by the long run growth rates of
the mean knowledge levels. The average knowledge in the economy, for a particular value












and will be evaluated close to the end of the simulation horizon. Obviously, there is no p
value for the homogeneous mixing case, denoted H. To understand the eﬀect of having a







We are interested in the inﬂuence of two parameters. The ﬁrst is p ∈ [0,1],w h i c h
determines the network structure. The second is γ ∈ [1,5] which measures the selectivity
and leapfrogging eﬀects, as explained above.
3.1 Homogeneous mixing
The results for the case of homogeneous mixing are given in Figure 3, which provides a
box-plot representation of growth rates as a function of γ.
Knowledge growth is lowest when γ =1 . This is no surprise as the complete absence
of leapfrogging implies (see Figure 1, panel 1) absorption until nothing remains to absorb,
and knowledge levels remain constant thereafter. From Figure 3, it is clear that there is a
critical level of γ that yields maximum growth, and after which growth falls. Considering
the discussion above, this fall can be explained very simply: randomness reinforces the
eﬀect of selectivity. Consider cliquishness. Cliquishness generates similarity in knowledge
levels, so in a non-cliquish world, knowledge levels are dispersed. This implies that in a
non-cliquish world, the range of people who can leapfrog is relatively small and so is the
growth of knowledge attributable to leapfrogging. Obviously there is no world having lower
12Figure 3: The distribution of growth rates under homogeneous mixing.
cliquishness than a world of homogeneous mixing. Hence knowledge generation is weak in
the presence of high selectivity eﬀects (large γ), even though those who leapfrog make very
large gains.
This is also directly visible from Figure 2, in which we see that the relative importance
of selectivity and leapfrogging vary with γ, a n dt h eb e s to v e r a l lg r o w t hi sa c h i e v e df o r
γ ≈ 3. Just like the expected amount of knowledge creation, the simulated growth rate
also has an interior peak.
3.2 Knowledge dynamics in the network
Figure 4 shows the relationship between network architecture, characterised by the dis-
order in the network (the parameter p), and knowledge growth for diﬀerent values of γ.
We present both the original data points and, for each p-value, the corresponding non-
parametric kernel estimate. This convention applies to all the following ﬁgures.
Broadly speaking, at any p-value, the relationship between γ and knowledge growth is
13only weakly increasing: knowledge growth increases and then ﬂattens out. For p close to
1, we get slightly more: a pattern similar to the one reported in the previous paragraph
in the case of homogenous mixing, with an increase followed by a decrease, the peak being
around γ =3 . More interesting, however, is that for low values of γ knowledge growth
rates increase with p,w h e r e a sf o rh i g hγ values, knowledge growth rates decrease with p.
In other words, when relative contribution of imitation to total knowledge creation is high
(low γ), a random world (high p) dominates other structures. At the other extreme, when
innovation is relatively important (high γ) a cliquish world (low p)p e r f o r m sb e s t .
Figure 4: Growth rate of knowledge as a function of p,f o ras e to fγ-values.
When γ is low, rc approaches 1. Leapfrogging disappears as an important part of
knowledge growth, since there are few agents able to leapfrog, and the extent to which
they overtake the broadcaster is very small. Thus imitation becomes the driver of knowl-
edge accumulation, and short paths will contribute to rapid growth. At the same time,
since leapfrogging is not important, and agents far beneath the broadcaster can still ab-
sorb signiﬁcant amounts of knowledge, similarity becomes unimportant and the value of
14cliquishness, which creates similarity among neighbours’ knowledge levels (see Figure 5),
disappears.8 When short paths are valuable, and cliquishness is not, a random graph,
which has small diameter, will be most eﬃcient in producing knowledge.
On the other hand, when γ is high, leapfrogging becomes important, and agents who
leapfrog make big advances. Thus, a weak agent (one whose knowledge level puts him/her
below rc), is unable to leapfrog, and further learns little by imitating (the g(·,·) function
lies close to the 45 degree line for low r<r c). Such agents will rapidly be “left behind”.
What connects this observation to the result above is that in a cliquish world, agents tend
to have knowledge levels similar to their neighbours. This is shown in Figure 5. In a
cliquish world, when an agent broadcasts, most of his/her neighbours will be above the rc
threshold, and thus can leapfrog him/her, making big advances. Thus relatively few agents
get “left behind” and aggregate knowledge levels grow rapidly. When γ is high, cliquish
structures produce rapid knowledge growth.
Figure 5: Neighbourhood dissimilarity as a function of network architecture.
8If γ falls below 1, the bulk of knowledge accumulation shifts to those agents far below the broadcaster.
153.3 Comparison of random mixing and network cases
Figure 6 shows the re-scaled growth rates, ρ∗
t, using the growth rates in the homogeneous
mixing model as the norm. The pattern is essentially the same as for the non-normalized
growth rates in Figure 4. There is, though, observable value from a networked structure
when γ i sh i g h ,w h i l et h e r ei so b s e r v a b l ec o s tf r o mn e t w o r k sw h e nγ is low. The value of
a network, however, changes with the structure of the network. We observe in Figure 6
that as p approaches 1, the value (positive or negative) of a network disappears (ρ → 1).
This clearly implies that in this model the random network most closely approximates
a homogeneous mixing model. At the other extreme, we observed above that for low γ
cliquishness has a strong negative impact on growth. A homogeneous mixing model is in
a sense the least cliquish situation possible, and so we see (Figure 6) that ρ(0) < ρ(H).
Conversely for large γ t h eo p p o s i t ei st r u e ,a n dt h u sρ(0) > ρ(H).
Figure 6: Normalized growth rates.
What this suggests is that in industries wherein imitation is important a policy favouring
16networking and perhaps clustering may be misplaced. Important in interpreting this remark
is the condition implied by Figure 1, namely that all agents, regardless of their prevailing
knowledge stocks, can learn signiﬁcant amounts from a broadcaster. This could be the
case, for example, in a relatively mature industry in which knowledge tends to be highly
codiﬁed. On the other hand, when a recipient must be highly knowledgeable to use the
information he/she receives in an eﬀective way, we see that networks, and in particular
cliquish networks or industrial clusters are structures to foster.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have focused on the knowledge sharing and creation within a population
of agents and how the medium of interaction contributes to the long run knowledge growth
rates. We distinguished between two mediums of interaction; the ﬁrst in which there is
no network structure; agents interact and share knowledge randomly, and the second in
which interaction is facilitated by a certain ﬁxed network. We also considered diﬀerent
network architectures, at one extreme we took the case of completely regular network in
which there is high cliquishness and average path lengths are high. At the other extreme
we took a completely random network structure, characterized by low path length and low
cliquishness. We considered the cases that fall between these two extremes.
In the process of new knowledge creation, we modelled ongoing innovation in a com-
munity of actors, based on the idea that innovation is largely a result of knowledge sharing
among a small group of agents. In doing so, we distinguished between industries according
to the extent of innovative potential. We took into account the tacitness of knowledge and
technological opportunities in assessing innovative potential. Especially in the early stages
of the industry life cycle, the industries are characterized by high technological opportuni-
ties, yet knowledge is tacit, which decreases the extent of absorption. The functional form
that we employ in knowledge creation permits us to model this aspect, with the parameter
γ, which measures both the creation of knowledge and the distribution of it. We assumed
that highly tacit knowledge renders the prior knowledge level of the recipient important,
i.e. who gets the knowledge matters more for innovation. In this sense, high γ implies that
knowledge ﬂow is more selective, i.e.; the agents in the high end of the knowledge spectrum
17beneﬁt more in terms of leapfrogging the sender and thus make better use of the available
technological opportunities. Low levels of γ has the opposite eﬀect. Here, knowledge could
be seen as more codiﬁed, yet technological opportunities are lower. Thus, a wider range
of agents can beneﬁt from a broadcast (knowledge ﬂow is less selective), but the extent to
which they can leapfrog the sender is limited.
Our results reveal that the existence of network structure can signiﬁcantly increase the
long run knowledge growth rates. But this result depends on the innovative potential of the
industry. Increased regularity in the network increases long run growth rates for high values
of γ. This implies that regularity and cliquishness is better in industries characterized by
more tacit knowledge, and higher technological opportunities. On the other hand, the case
with no network structure proved to be better for low γ values; i.e. when the knowledge
is more codiﬁed, but there are fewer opportunities to leapfrog the sender. The diﬀerence
between the no-network and network cases diminishes as the network architecture becomes
more random. Our results tend to support the hypothesis that spatial clustering is better
in industries where knowledge is highly tacit, and there are large amounts of technological
opportunities to explore.
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